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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
DISTRICT COURT 
CASE NO. 226426 
HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC., 
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD, 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 15018 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in tort, alleging negligence of 
the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad in the collision of a truck 
against the side of a moving train occupying a highway grade 
crossing. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the close of the evidence, the court directed a 
verdict in favor of respondent. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal and remand to the 
District Court, on the sole ground there is a J'ury ques-
tion whether the train sounded its whistle in accord with 
the applicable statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of August 12, 1973, plaintiff 
was a passenger in a truck driven East on 9000 South Street 
in Salt Lake County, through the intersection of the rail· 
road grade crossing at 412 West, into the side of a train 
which was already occupying the crossing. The railroad 
crossing, and the approaches to it, are clearly marked wit: 
devices painted on the pavement and signs posted on the 
shoulder of the road 3 0 0 feet back from the crossing, with 
a flashing light mounted on a post at the side of the eros:· 
ing, with four flashing lights on cantilever arms above the 
crossing, and with a bell. All of these devices were seen, 
functioning properly, at the time of the accident in ques· 
tion by at least one witness apiece. Appellant makes no 
effort to controvert any of these facts. 
The approaching train rang its bell and blew i~ 
whistle from a distance in excess of a quarter mile from 
the crossing, and all the way through the crossing. The 
h train 
whistle was perceived by numerous witnesses when t e 
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was at varying distances from the crossing, depending upon 
the attentiveness of the witness and his position in relation-
ship to the train. 
One witness, Michael Peterson, testified that he 
could not recall hearing the whistle from his position in the 
yard of a nearby house. At another point, however, he testi-
fied that he had heard the whistle. (Tr. p. 19.) He also 
testified that he'd lived in the house for several years, and 
had grown accustomed to frequent train whistles, so that he 
often ignored the whistle as the train went by. (Tr. p. 20.) 
He testified, in effect, that he simply wasn't paying atten-
tion to the whistle on this occasion. (Tr. pp. 19-20.) 
Two ladies, Mrs. Nelson and Mrs. Wagstaff, crossed 
the intersection in a car going West just before the accident. 
Their testimony indicates that the whistle of the train star-
tled them just as their car reached the tracks and the train 
was perhaps 300 feet from the crossing. (Tr. pp. 23, 25, 33.) 
The testimony of other witnesses, however, clearly establishes, 
and appellant does not here dispute, that at that moment the 
flasher devices above and beside the crossing were flashing 
and the bell at the crossing was ringing. Mrs. Nelson and 
Mrs. Wagstaff were apparently completely oblivious to these 
indications of the approach of the train. (Tr. pp. 29, 37.) 
With respect to these ladies, it seems an inescapable con-
clusion that they simply were not paying attention as the 
-3-
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situation demanded. The ladies, in any case, each testifk 
that they had not been paying attention to the whistle. 
(Tr. pp. 29, 37.) 
A gas station owner, at a station about as distar.: 
from the crossing as the Peterson house, testified by depos: 
tion that he would prefer not to guess how long he heard t:1: 
whistle, but, if forced to, would guess substantially in 
excess of 5 seconds. (Deposition of Allan Karas, pp. 17,: 
19.) He heard the whistle just before he got under a truer 
to repair it; he then got under the truck. The whistle bl:. 
a full five seconds while he was under the truck. He thouc· 
the whistle had stopped for some time before the accident. 
(Deposition p. 19.) By any reasonable estimation, this plai 
the train at the time of the whistle heard by Karas several 
hundred feet further back from the crossing than the 300 f:• 
contended by appellant. 
Highway Patrol Officer Richard Mattingly testifii 
that he was stopped, just before the accident, giving a tic· 
to a motorist, on a freeway parallel to the railroad track; 
As the train passed his patrol car, it was (by subsequent 
measurement) 4/10 of a mile from the crossing, and Officer 
Mattingly heard the whistle blow at that point. (Tr. P· l·: 
The train's engineer testified unequivocallY tha: 
he blew the whistle at least a quarter of a mile from the 
crossing. (Tr. p. 52.) He also testified that he bl~~ 
-4-
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standard pattern of whistles: "two longs, a short, and 
a long." (Tr. p. 52.) It seems apparent that some of the 
witnesses heard only the last long blast, while some heard 
the entire whistle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE 
TRAIN WHISTLE BE BLOWN "AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH MILE 
BEFORE REACHING" A CROSSING, AND MAKES THE RAIL-
ROAD LIABLE ONLY FOR SUCH DAMAGE AS RESULTS FROM 
FAILURE SO TO BLOW THE WHISTLE. 
The statute relied upon by plaintiff herein, 
§56-1-14, U.C.A. (1953), provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Every locomotive shall be provided 
with a bell which shall be rung continu-
ously from a point not less than eighty 
rods from any city or town street or pub-
lic highway grade crossing until such city 
or town street or public highway grade 
crossing shall be crossed, but, except in 
towns and at terminal points, the sounding 
of the locomotive whistle or siren at least 
one-fourth of a mile before reaching any 
such grade crossing shall be deemed equiv-
alent to ringing the bell as aforesaid; 
during the prevalence of fogs, snow and 
dust storms, the locomotive whistle shall 
be sounded before each street crossing 
while passing through cities and towns ..• 
Every person in charge of a locomotive 
violating the provisions of this se~tion is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and the ra~lroad . 
company shall be liable for all damages wh~ch 
any person may sustain by reason of such v~o­
lation. 
-5-
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There is no contention here that the train in 
question was "in town" or at a terminal point. Thus the 
requirement of the statute was that the locomotive ring 
its bell continuously from 80 rods before the crossing 
until it was through the crossing, ~that it sound its 
whistle at least 1/4 mile before the crossing. The whis-
tle need not be blown continuously: the continuous re-
quirement applies to the bell. The whistle need not be 
sounded at precisely 1/4 mile from the crossing. Any 
distance 1/4 mile or more satisfies the statute. Moreover 
it is obvious that the statute does not make the railroad 
liable, as appellant seems to suppose, for any damage whic.· 
follows a failure to blow the whistle in strict accordance 
with the statute. The railroad is liable under the statut: 
only for such damage as would not have occurred except for 
the failure to blow the whistle. 
It is readily apparent in this case both that tl:i 
whistle was blown at least l/4 mile from the crossing, and 
that the sounding of the whistle had no causative connecti: 
to the collision that occurred. 
POINT II. 
THE ONLY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IS THAT THE WHISTLE 
SOUNDED AT LEAST 1/4 MILE F'ROl-1 THE CROSSING. 
Appellant's presentation in the District court 
-6-
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simply ignored the ancient distinction between negative 
and positive testimony, and the rule that negative tes-
timony is insufficient even to raise a conflict with 
positive testimony so as to require submission of the 
issue to a jury. Appellant's brief attempts to cure 
this defect ex post facto. 
Positive testimony is the testimony of a wit-
ness that he observed a thing to occur. Negative testi-
mony is testimony that the witness did not observe wheth-
er a thing occurred, or does not know, or does not recall 
whether a thing occurred. The testimony of witnesses, 
such as Mr. Peterson, Mrs. Wagstaff and Mrs. Nelson in 
this case, that they don't recall a whistle, though it 
may have blown without their hearing it, or that they 
heard the whistle at a particular point, but do not know 
whether it blew earlier, is simply negative testimony 
about whether the whistle was blown earlier or for longer 
than the witnesses heard it. The testimony of the train 
engineer that he blew the whistle at least a quarter mile 
from the crossing, and the testimony of the Highway Patrol 
Officer that he heard the whistle blow a measured distance 
of 4/10 of a mile from the crossing is positive testimony. 
In the face of the positive testimony, the negative tes-
timony must be wholly discounted and cannot sustain a 
verdict. ~, Hudson v. union Pacific Railroad Company, 
-7-
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120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357 (1951); Anderson v. Union Pacif; 
Railroad Company, 76 Utah 324, 289 P. 146, (1930); Jensen, 
~
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101 
(1922). For that reason, the only credible evidence ~ ~u 
case on the question whether the train whistle was blown i; 
accordance with the statute was testimony that it was in f: 
so blown. There was simply no question on this point to gc 
to the jury. 
To have created a jury issue in this case, appell 
would have had to ascertain that the witnesses he relies uc 
were not only in a position to hear, but listened for a whr 
tle and did not hear one. This was not done. Each, in iac· 
testified that he or she was not listening, or not 5>aying 
attention. The testimony of these witnesses is therefore 
negative testimony, and must be discounted. The cases cit: 
above clearly demonstrate the rule. 
In Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
supra, plaintiff's witness Priest testified that he was ne;: 
plaintiff's deceased at the time he was struck by the tra~ 
but that he did not hear the train's whistle. His attentic 
at the time was on another train. The crew of the train ir 
valved in the collision testified that the whistle had beer 
blown properly. The Utah Supreme Court said: 
"In view of all these circumstances and 
conditions, it cannot be contended that 
the testimony of the witness Priest to 
-8-
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l' 
the effect that he did not hear the bell 
ring or the whistle blow can be considered 
as evidence at all that the bell did not 
ring or the whistle did not blow. 
59 Utah at 376. 
In Anderson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
supra, two witnesses, including the train engineer, testi-
fied that the whistle was properly blown before the acci-
dent, and two witnesses who were in the vicinity testified 
that they did not hear a whistle. The Utah Supreme Court 
said at § 79 Utah 331: 
The foregoing is, in substance, all 
of the testimony touching the question of 
the claimed negligence of the defendant in 
failing to sound the whistle and ring the 
bell as the train approached the point of 
the accident. Upon this evidence the plain-
tiff was not entitled to go to the jury on 
such questions. The testimony of a witness 
which is merely to the effect that he did 
not hear a whistle blown or a bell rung is 
not sufficient to overcome positive and di-
rect testimony that the whistle was sounded 
and the bell rung. To entitle negative tes-
timony such as that of Redden and Thompson 
affecting the ringing of the bell and the 
blowing of the whistle on the occasion in 
question to any probative value, it must 
be made to appear that they were paying 
some attention to what actually occurred 
and that they were in a position where they 
could and did observe what was done or what 
was not done. Clark v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company (Utah) 257 P. 1050, and cases 
there cited. 
Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, is to 
the same effect, except that the court there found that 
the witness was in a position to hear, and was directing 
-9-
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her attention to the sound, but heard nothing. 
Appellant claims in this case that Mrs. Wagstaff 
and Mrs. Nelson come within the exception for witnesses whc 
are in a position to hear and are paying attention, but do 
not hear. Appellant wishes to create the impression that 
these women saw the train and directed their attention to 
it because of the risk it represented to them, but that the. 
heard no whistle until sometime later when the train was v;: 
close. Their testimony is more to the effect that they wer, 
frightened and distracted by the sight of the train, and pa. 
no attention to any other signals. (Tr. pp. 24-29, 33-37.) 
For example, though the evidence is ample that the crossin: 
lights were flashing and the crossing bell was ringing, the 
women perceived neither. The conclusion is inescapable thr 
they were paying attention to something else, if they were 
paying attention to anything. 
The cases cited by appellant are readily distin· 
guished from the quotations in appellant's brief. In ~ 
v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 9 Utah 141, 33 P. 626, (18~; 
cited at page 6 of appellant's brief, the Court is at pain: 
to point out that "The plaintiff testified that he look~ 
and listened for the train; that no whistle was sounded, a: 
no bell was rung, in approaching the crossing. Walters·· 
swears to substantially the same thing," and that none of 
sror defendant's witnesses claimed that the bell was rung. ~ 
-10-
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in short, was a case in which there was positive testi-
mony that the bell was not rung, and no testimony at all 
that it was rung. It has no bearing on the present case. 
Haun v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 22 Utah 346, 
62 P. 908 (1900), cited at page 7 of appellant's brief, is 
to the same effect, and equally inapplicable, in that the 
Court there carefully points out that plaintiff's witnesses 
testified that they "were in view of the place of the ac-
cident, and in a position where they could easily see and 
hear what transpired," and "that they neither saw nor 
heard the whistle or the bell, that their hearing was good, 
and that their attention was directed to the approach of 
the train, and as to whether the whistle was blown and the 
bell rung." 
Appellant in this case simply did not ask any of 
his witnesses whether their attention was directed to the 
approach of the train and the sounding of the whistle before 
they heard the whistle blow, so as to eliminate the possi-
bility that they were not paying attention and that the 
whistle was blowing without their hearing it. Respondent, 
on the other hand, carefully asked each of these witnesses 
whether or not it was possible that the whistle was blowing 
before they heard it. Each agreed that it was possible. 
The testimony of these witnesses was negative testimony 
only, and not entitled to go to the jury. 
-11-
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POINT III. 
THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED WHISTLE WAS BLOWN. 
It is evident that appellant 1 s witnesses could 
not and would not testify that the train's whistle was not 
blown at least a quarter mile from the crossing. Nor does 
their testimony tend to indicate such a thing. It is sim· 
ply that they heard, or didn 1 t hear, the whistle at a point 
near the crossing, and cannot say whether it blew further 
up the track. 
The engineer and the Highway Patrol Officer couE 
and did say that the whistle was blown at least a quarter 
mile before the crossing. Appellant seems to contend that 
since the officer heard the whistle at 4/10 of a mile fioo 
the crossing, and did not testify that he heard it at pre· 
cisely 1/4 mile back, his testimony does not indicate com· 
pliance with the statute. The requirement, however, is 
that the whistle be blown "at least one quarter mile" back, 
Four tenths of a mile clearly will do. The statute was 
satisfied. 
POINT IV. 
THE ALLEGED FAILURE PROPERLY TO BLOW THE WHISTLE 
HAD NO EFFECT UPON ANY DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF. 
Even viewing the evidence about the train whistle 
-12-
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in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is obvious 
that the alleged failure to blow the whistle at 1/4 mile 
from the crossing could have had no causative effect upon 
the collision that occurred. 
The positive aspect of the testimony of plain-
tiff's witnesses is that the train blew its whistle when 
it was approximately 300 feet from the crossing. It is 
undisputed in this case that 90th South, on which plain-
tiff was traveling, crosses the tracks at right angles, 
that the train and truck were going the same speed, 50 m.p.h., 
and that the front of the train was 72 feet through the cross-
ing when the truck struck it. Thus, it is evident that, from 
the time these witnesses say the train blew its whistle until 
the time of the collision, the train traveled at least 372 
feet (300 feet to the crossing, and 72 feet through it). 
The truck, traveling at the same speed and at right angles 
would have gone the same distance, 372 feet, from the sound-
ing of the whistle to the collision. Under our law, it is 
presumed that a motorist sees and hears what is seen and 
heard by others in the vicinity with a like opportunity to 
perceive. E.g., Wilson v. oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466 (1909); Nuttall v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Railroad Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P.2d 15 (1940); 
Nabrotzky v. s. L. & utah R. Co., 103 Utah 274, 135 P.2d 115, 
(1943). It must be presumed, then, that, regardless of 
-13-
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whether or not he heard a train whistle blown when the 
train was a quarter mile from the crossing, plaintiff, 5 
driver heard the train whistle when the truck he was 
driving was approximately 372 feet from the crossing. 
Plaintiff's accident reconstructionist testified that 
at 30 m.p.h. the truck could readily have been stopped 
in 144 feet (Tr. pp. 45, 48.), and the accident avoided. 
While there was no testimony directly on point, it seems 
obvious that at 50 m.p.h. the truck could have stopped 
in 372 feet. 
The only rational construction of the evidence 
presented in this case is that the collision occurred 
because the driver of the truck ignored all of the sig-
nals of the approach of the train -- the pavement markings, 
the signs, the roadside flashers, the overhead flashers, 
the bell, and the train whistle. The train whistle wu 
blown, even according to the testimony of appellant's wit· 
nesses as appellant construes it, in ample time for the 
driver to avoid the accident. It cannot be claimed in 
that circumstance that any failure to blow the whistle 
even earlier caused any damage to appellant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
. · f reversal Appellant subm1ts as the sole bas1s or 
the contention that a jury in this matter might properlY 
-14-
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have found that respondent's train did not blow its whis-
tle 1/4 mile back from the crossing in question, and that 
as a result appellant was damaged. The only positive 
evidence on the point, however, is the testimony of the 
train engineer and the Highway Patrol Officer that the 
whistle was blown at least a quarter mile in advance of 
the crossing. Thus sounding the whistle clearly satifies 
the applicable statute, §56-1-14, U.C.A. (1953). The 
negative inferences to be drawn from the testimony of 
appellant's witnesses that they heard the whistle at a 
different point do not even create a conflict in the evi-
dence. There was, therefore, nothing on this point to 
submit to the jury. Even if this were not so, it is evi-
dent that reasonable minds could only conclude that sound-
ing the whistle even as appellant claims it was sounded in 
this case, had no causal effect upon any damages sustained 
by plaintiff, and creates no liability in the railroad 
under §56-1-14. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 
_: ...... 
- day of August, 
1977. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CO~~WALL 
& McCARTHY/ 
/I 
By L 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for Respondents 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-3333 
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